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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
upon the discretion of an executive official. In view of this danger the
recent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court 3 is disappointing.
Hopefully, the determining factor in the denial was that no attempt to
restrain publication of specific material has yet been made. 4 If so, the
Court, upon actual submission of material and denial of authorization
to publish, could still determine that judicial review of the classification
system is necessary for the protection of our cherished freedoms of
speech and press.
KENNETH L. EAGLE
Consumer Protection-Disclosure of Cognovit Provisions as Security
Interests Under the Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act,' which became effective on July 1, 1969,
provides: "[I]t is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.' 2 Pursuant to authority granted by the Act,3
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has published
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z4 to implement the purposes of the
Act. Prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending Act, it was impossible
for most consumers to purchase credit in any rational or intelligent
manner5 The problem was not simply an inability to understand com-
plex finance charges, for consumers were (and still are) often intimi-
dated by the legalistic language that is so lavishly employed in both the
large and fine print of loan instruments.
Creditors often retain security interests' within the body of loan
-93 S. Ct. 553 (1972).
"4McCormick, Marchetti v. United States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1972, at 21, cols. 5-6 (city
ed.).
,15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
VId. § 160 1.
d.
112 C.F.R. Part 226 (1972).
5B. CLARK & J. FONESCA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 137 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CLARK & FONESCA].
6 "Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which se-
cures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages,
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instruments. This may be unknown to the debtor, or if known, the legal
effect is generally not fully understood.7 For this reason, the Truth in
Lending Act requires that creditors disclose security interests that arise
from consumer credit sales that are not connected with an open-end
credit plan." In a recent case, Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co.,9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reached an
unsatisfying result by reversing the district court and holding that a
confession of judgment or cognovit clause 10 need not be disclosed as a
security interest by creditors in Alaska. The court arrived at this result
in a manner that seems overly technical and against the spirit and
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act."
Sandra Douglas had instituted a class action against Beneficial
Finance Company by charging that Beneficial had violated the Act by
failing to make disclosure of confession of judgment clauses contained
in promissory notes taken as evidence of debts owed by members of the
class to Beneficial. 12 The cognovit clause employed by Beneficial pro-
vided that the debtor consented to the jurisdiction of any state and that
Beneficial could have judgment by confession without notice. The clause
also provided that the debtor waived all rights of exemption and that
no lien would be created on any real property used as a principal resi-
dence during the term of the note.
1 3
deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not recorded, mech-
nic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's liens in both real and
personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any
lien on property arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to
secure payment or performance of an obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1972).
7CLARK & FONESCA 110.
815 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10)(1970). Under an open-end credit plan (such as a credit card or
revolving charge account), the Act requires disclosure of "[t]he conditions under which the creditor
may retain or acquire any security interest in any property to secure the payment of any credit
extended under the plan .... " Id. § 1637(a)(7).
1469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
"0A confession of judgment or cognovit clause, sometimes referred to as a warrant of attorney,
generally takes the form of a consent given by the debtor to the jurisdiction of any forum along
with authorization for the creditor's attorney to appear and confess judgment against him. Both
notice and opportunity to defend are waived.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
2469 F.2d at 454. The district court held that Beneficial did not have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the cognovit clause. Douglas y. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166,
1176 (D. Alas. 1971).
"The clause in question reads as follows in all of the notes:
Undersigned jointly and severally authorize and empower any attorney of law of
any court of record of the State of Alaska or elsewhere in the United States to appear
1973]
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The Act requires that creditors disclose "[a] description of any
security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in
connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the
property to which the security interest relates."" Any debtor to whom
a creditor fails to make the required disclosures may bring an action
against the creditor for damages. 5 In such an action the debtor may
recover twice the amount of finance charges with the limitation that the
total amount of recovery may not be less than one hundred dollars nor
greater than one thousand dollars." In addition, if the action is success-
ful the debtor may recover the costs of the action along with reasonable
attorney's fees.' 7 The debtor has the right to rescind any transaction in
which the creditor acquires a security interest in any real property if the
property is or is expected to be used as the principal residence of the
debtor." This right to rescind may be exercised only until midnight of
the third business day after the transaction is consummated 9 if the
creditor discloses to the debtor his rights under section 1635. The debtor
has an indefinite right to rescind, however, if the creditor fails to make
the required notice and disclosure."0 Douglas sought damages for herself
and the members of their class and sought the right to rescind for those
members of the class who owned real property used or expected to be
used as a principle residence.
2'
for undersigned, or any one of undersigned, on an action on this note in any court of
the United States, State of Alaska or elsewhere in the United States at any time after
default in the payment of the amount of any installment of principal and interest
thereon, and confess judgment against any one or ll of the undersigned for the amount
due with interest and charges permitted by said Section 06.20.260, of the Alaska Stat-
utes, all without any benefit of valuation and appraisal laws. All parties hereto severally
waive demand and presentment for payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of protest
and protest of this note and agree that their liability hereunder shall not be affected by
any extension of the time of payment of all or any part of the amount owing hereon at
any time or times, and further waive all rights of exemption under the laws of this State.
It is understood and agreed that this clause shall not operate to create a lien on any real
property owned and occupied by the undersigned as a principle residence at any time
during the term of this note.
334 F. Supp. at 1170.
"15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10) (1970).
1515 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
1615 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
1715 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
115 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
'Od.
2'Letter from Griffith L. Garwood, December 30, 1969, in 4 CCH Consumer Credit
Guide 30,245 at 66,112 (1972).
21334 F. Supp. at 1178.
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Security interests are defined in Federal Reserve Board Regulation
Z to include "other consensual or confessed liens whether or not re-
corded. 12 Critical to the decisions of both the district court and the
court of appeals is the Board's Interpretation of the definition of "secu-
rity interest:"
(b) In some of the States, confession of judgment clauses or cognovit
provisions are lawful and make it possible for the holder of an obliga-
tion containing such clause or provision to record a lien on property
of the obligor simply by recordation entry of judgment; the obligor is
afforded no opportunity to enter a defense against such action prior
to entry of the judgment.
(c) Since confession of judgment clauses and cognovit provisions in
such States have the effect of depriving the obligor of the right to be
notified of a pending action and to enter a defense in a judicial proceed-
ing before judgment may be entered or recorded against him, such
clauses and provisions in those states are security interests . . .23
The district court held that the confession of judgment clause used by
Beneficial in its notes 4 was a security interest requiring disclosure under
section 1639(a)(8) of the Act. 5
Alaska has a statute which purports to make confessions of judg-
ment lawful even without notice.2 However, the district court's interpre-
tation of the requirements of rule 57(c) of the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure 7 would preclude entry of judgment without notice because
rule 93 provides for the superiority of the rules when there is a conflict
with any other statutory provision concerning procedure.2 8 Conse-
quently, the district court predicated its damage award for failure to
disclose a security interest on the impact of a confession of judgment
clause:
It is frequently stated that a forum court in a conflict of law situation
1See note 6 supra.
2Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z Interpretation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.202(b)-(c) (emphasis
added).
21See note 13 supra.
1334 F. Supp. at 1170.
2
ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1962).
2 The confession shall be made, assented to and acknowledged and judgment
given in the same manner as a confession in an action pending, but in addition, the
confession shall be verified by the oath of the person making it, and shall authorize a
judgment to be given for a particular sum.
Alaska R. Civ. P. 57(c)(2).
2334 F. Supp. at 1171.
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will apply its . . . own procedural law. [Citing Lillegraven v. Tengs,
375 P.2d 139 (Alaska 1962).] If, as defendant contends and Rule 57
implies, the entry of judgment pursuant to a confession is a procedural
matter, then the forum state need not apply Alaska Rule 57. If, on the
other hand, confession of judgment is a matter of substantive law, then
Rule 93 would be inapplicable and A.S. 09.30.050 would permit entry
of judgment without notice, not only in Alaska, but in any state look-
ing to Alaska law. In either case the confession ofjudgment clause runs
afoul of the Truth in Lending ActY.
2
The Court of Appeals reversed. The notes were executed in and
subject to the laws of Alaska. The appellate court relied on the absence
of any evidence that would indicate that Beneficial had ever secured
judgments in other states as hypothesized by the lower court." Then
the court proceeded:
In such circumstances, we hold that the district court's decision disre-
gards the Board's interpretation of its regulation, which states that
confession of judgment clauses are security interests "in those States"
in which judgment may be entered without notice and hearing. The
district court's view would make this limitation meaningless.',
Confessions of judgment are not held in high regard by many com-
mentators."2 The courts have also given the practice rather close scru-
tiny in recent cases. 3 However, the practice was able to survive a
constitutional attack under the due process clause in two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co. 4
and Swarb v. Lennox, 35 that held that confessions of judgment were not
illegal per se.36 Nevertheless, the correctness of the decision in Douglas
must depend upon the Truth in Lending Act and the prescriptions of
21Id. at 1173.
3469 F.2d at 456.
3 1d.
32"There is a nearly unanimous feeling of distaste toward the cognovit note . CLARK
& FONSECA 11l. But see Note, Consumer Protection-Truth in Lending and the Cognovlt
Judgment, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 216 (1970) in which the procedure is defended as it is applied in
Wisconsin on the grounds of economy and efficiency.
33E.g., Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrinc,
25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
34405 U.S. 174 (1972).
-405 U.S. 191 (1972).
36For a discussion of Overmyer and Swarb, see Note, Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes:
Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Civil Cases, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 554 (1973).
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System rather than upon
the esteem in which the device of confession of judgment is held.
In fact, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's interpre-
tation of the pertinent statutory and regulatory material only so far as
the meaning to be afforded the Board's Interpretation of section
226.2(z) of Regulation Z.
37
It is true that the Board interprets confession of judgment clauses
to be security interests only "in those States" in which a judgment can
be awarded without notice and a hearing.35 However, it is also true that
the Board said, "In some of the States, confession of judgment clauses
or cognovit provisions are lawful and make it possible . . . to record a
lien on property. . . simply by recordation entry of judgment. .... ,,3
While the choice of law rules in this area are confused and diverse, 0 it
seems clear that many states would probably apply the Alaska law in
passing upon the validity of cognovit notes executed in Alaska." Fur-
thermore, Alaska courts would probably give full faith and credit to
judgments taken on such notes in other states.42 However, in Atlas
Credit Corp. v. Ezrine4 3 the New York Court of Appeals held that
judgments obtained in Pennsylvania under a cognovit note were not
entitled to full faith and credit as they were not true judgments and that
judgments obtained under cognovit notes violate due process of law.
Since Alaska has a specific statutory provision providing for cognovit
notes, its courts might be less likely to follow the lead of New York.
4
Therefore, it would seem that the district court's "hypothetical" is real-
istic and that Alaska law may "make it possible"4 to acquire a judg-
ment by confession.
The Board's interpretation must share the blame for the Court of
Appeals decision. The interpretation is ambiguous and clearly admits
of the meaning applied to it by the appellate court. However, the over-
31See text accompanying note 23 supra.
-12 C.F.R. § 226.202(c) (1972) (emphasis added).
3912 C.F.R. § 226.202(b) (1972) (emphasis added).
"See generally Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 111 (1961); Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina,
48 N.C.L. REv. 243 (1970).
"See 47 Am. JUR. 2d Judgments § 1120, at 166-68 (1969); Schuchman, Confession of Judg-
ment as a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 461, 464-65 (1961).
12See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1955).
4325 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
11334 F. Supp. at 1171.
4512 C.F.R. § 226.202(b) (1972).
19731
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riding purpose of the Act is to require disclosure; it is concerned with
state law only to the extent of ensuring that consumers have the neces-
sary information so that they may make a more rational use of credit.
The Truth in Lending Act seeks to protect the consumer-debtor," and
the effect upon him is the same no matter what legal process is employed
in securing the judgment against him. Consequently, the detrimental
effects of a confession of judgment clause dictate that it be included
within the interpretation of security interest unless it is clearly excluded
by the Federal Reserve Board regulations or interpretations. Therefore
the district court's decision would seem to be more closely aligned with
the purpose and spirit of the Truth in Lending Act.
Since the court of appeals decided that the cognovit provisions
contained in Beneficial's notes were not security interests requiring dis-
closure under the Turth in Lending Act, the issue of rescission was not
reached. The district court did reach the issue and found that the right
to rescind existed.
47
The Truth in Lending Act makes the following provision concern-
ing rescission:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any con-
sumer credit transaction in which a security interest is retained or
acquired in any real property which is used or is expected to be used
as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the
third business day following the consummation of the transaction or
the delivery of the disclosures required under this section . . .
The pertinent language of Regulation Z provides for recission
where "a security interest is or will be retained or acquired" 9 in the
debtor's residential real property. The Board's Interpretation of section
226.2 says that cognovit clauses are security interests "even if the judg-
ment cannot be entered until after a default by the obligor.""0 However,
when a cognovit clause expressly states that all liens upon residential
real property are excluded from its operation, then the right to rescind
does not apply.5'
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
47334 F. Supp. at 1178.
4315 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970).
"912 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1972) (emphasis added).




Beneficial's note contained this sentence: "It is understood and
agreed that this clause shall not operate to create a lien on any real
property owned and occupied by the undersigned as a principle resi-
dence at any time during the term of this note.
'5 2
The district court held that the unlimited right to rescind applied
since the note would expire upon default by the debtor and entry of
judgment and Beneficial would not be precluded by the terms of the note
from recording a lien upon the debtor's home after judgment because
the debtor waived all exemption rights.
There is no reason to believe that the language in Beneficial's notes
concerning real property was included for any reason other than to
comply with the Board's Interpretation that precludes rescission if the
cognovit clause expressly excludes liens upon real property. 3 Beneficial
has given with one hand while taking away with the other. The district
court decided correctly in holding that this is not enough.
Overmeyer and Swarb have left the constitutional status of the
cognovit note uncertain. A clear holding of unconstitutionality would
have completely eliminated the problem. Some states do not allow the
use of cognovit notes, 4 some allow it with procedural restrictions (e.g.,
Alaska),5 and some allow the use of cognovit notes at least to some
extent without notice and hearing. If a note containing a cognovit
provision is executed in a state which prohibits the use of cognovit
provisions and judgment is sought there, then no problem arises. Again,
there is no problem when a note is executed in a state where the proce-
dural laws require that notice and a hearing be given to the
debtor-there would be no security interest under the Truth and Lend-
ing Act and the consumer is protected by notice and hearing. If a
cognovit note is executed in a state permitting the use of cognovit provi-
sions and judgment is sought there, then clearly disclosure must be made
under the Act.5 The difficulty arises when a note is executed in a state
2See note 13 supra (emphasis added).
-12 C.F.R. § 226.202(d) (1972).
"Note, Due Process-Confession of Judgment Procedures Are Not Unconstitutional Per Se,
25 VAND. L. REv. 613, 613 n.3 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Confession of Judg-
ments-Pennsylvania Entry of Judgment by Confession Procedure Based Upon Waiver of Notice
Without Adequate Understanding by the Debtors Held Violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 16 VILL. L. REv. 571, 573 n.9 (1971).
OSee note 54 supra.
5id.
5712 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1972).
1973]
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where the use of cognovit provisions is limited in some way and judg-
ment is later sought in another state with unrestricted cognovit provi-
sions. The state in which the judgment is sought could grant the judg-
ment without notice and hearing either through the application of its
own nonrestrictive laws or through application of its own procedural
rules in conjunction with the substantive law regarding the use of cog-
novit provisions of the state of execution.
The district court's solution to this problem was to require disclo-
sure in any case where it is possible for a creditor to obtain a judgment
against the debtor through the use of a cognovit clause without notice
and hearing. The court of appeals, by dwelling upon the language "in
those States""8 in the Board's Interpretation has replaced a solution that
is more in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Truth in Lending
Act with one that seems technical and against the purpose of the Act.
The impact of this decision is somewhat limited. As previously indi-
cated, only a few states allow unrestrictied use of cognovit provisions."
Moreover, the Swarb and Overmeyer decisions raise grave doubts as to
the constitutionality of the cognovit provisions employed by Beneficial
in this case and in most consumer credit transactions.
D. STEVE ROBBINS
Criminal Law-Increased Sentences on an Appeal by Right from Inferior
Courts
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina
v. Pearce' that a criminal defendant who had successfully appealed his
original conviction could not receive a more severe sentence on reconvic-
tion unless the increase directly resulted from defendant's conduct sub-
sequent to his original conviction. The Court concluded that while there
was no absolute constitutional bar to an increased sentence on retrial,2
due process precluded penalizing a defendant for having successfully
11469 F.2d at 456.
59See note 54 supra.
1395 U.S. 711 (1969).
"'We hold, therefore, that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection
Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction." Id. at 723.
[Vol. 51
